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ABSTRACT 
 
Social scientists agree that public confidence in social institutions is a crucial element in 
building democratic society. This is especially true for transitional societies including post-
communist countries, because the lack of public confidence in newly emerged democratic 
institutions can interfere with democratic development. Although different theories explaining 
public confidence in social institutions were developed, these theories ignored the role that 
mass media play in building public confidence. The goal of this study is to examine the 
connection between mass media coverage of social institutions and public confidence in these 
institutions by conducting content analysis of Belarusian newspapers, reviewing the results of 
the public opinion polls from Belarus, and exploring the links between coverage of social 
institutions and trust in them. Four institutions were chosen for this examination: two 
institutions with high level of confidence representing the state (the President, the military) and 
two institutions with low level of confidence representing civil society (independent labor 
unions, opposition political parties).  
Results showed that there is a noticeable connection between media coverage and public 
confidence in social institutions. Content analysis demonstrated that the state-run newspapers 
publish a great number of articles about Belarus President Lukashenko, covering him within the 
scope of explicitly positive themes. As results of public opinion polls demonstrate, the 
President enjoys an high level of confidence amongst people who trust state-run Media. On the 
other hand, independent newspapers present President Lukashenko in a negative different light: 
he is being depicted as a dictator and an ineffective leader. According to public opinion polls, 
people who trust the independent media are less confident in the President: more than 42% do 
have confidence in him. Given that state-run newspapers present the President almost 
exclusively within positive themes and independent newspapers seldom speak of the 
President’s achievements, concentrating mostly on his failures and shortcomings, we can see a 
strong connection between media coverage of the President and levels of public confidence in 
him. Examining media coverage and public opinion about other social institutions provided 
similar results, confirming the connection between media coverage and public confidence in 
this study. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Social science scholars agree that social trust is an essential component for the correct 
functioning of democratic political institutions (see Almond and Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993, 
1995, Sztompka, 1999) and of market economies (see Raiser, 1998). According to Sapsford 
and Abbott (2006), the phenomenon of social trust consists of several related components: 
confidence in social institutions and the social environment, trust in people and trust in the 
existing socio-economic order. 
Unfortunately, the literature shows no consistency in the use of terms “trust” and 
“confidence.” In some works, the word “trust” has very broad meaning, while the word 
“confidence” is used for trust only in social institutions, whereas in other works the words 
“trust” and “confidence” are used interchangeably. For the purpose of this study, the term 
“social trust” was used as a broader term, meaning the public’s expectation about the profitable 
behavior of a social agent (Falcone & Castelfranchi, 2001), while “confidence” was used when 
referring to public’s trust for social institutions. 
As my review of the literature demonstrates, the problems of trust in society and 
confidence in social institutions have been studied by scholars since the late 1960s. Moreover, 
the problem of eroding confidence in institutions in transitional societies (including post-
communist countries) has been the focus of research in different disciplines for more than 20 
years. The role that the mass media are playing in building public confidence in social 
institutions is, however, not thoroughly studied and is often ignored by sociologist and political 
scientists.  
 3 
As Walter Lippmann noted in 1922 in his famous work, Public Opinion, “the world that 
we have to deal with… is out of mind, out of sight, out of mind.” Nearly a century after 
Lippmann penned these words, McCombs (2004) wrote that most knowledge and information 
that people possess still comes from the mass media: “Today we also have television and 
expanding panoply of new communication technologies, but the central point is the same.” 
American journalist Theodore White described the power of the mass media over public 
opinion in 1972 as “an authority that in other nations is reserved for tyrants, priests, parties and 
mandarins (White, 1973).” Once again, McCombs (2004) commented, “In the years since 
White’s cogent observations, social scientists across the world have elaborated the ability of the 
mass media to influence many aspects of our political, social and cultural agendas.”  
Thus, it would be a major mistake to ignore the role of the mass media in building 
public confidence in social institutions. This thesis was conceptualized to make a small 
contribution toward filling the gap in existing knowledge on the topic by studying the 
connection between confidence in institutions and the media coverage of these institutions in 
Belarus. The theoretical background of this study is based on works by distinguished Polish 
sociologist Piotr Sztompka (1996, 1999, 2002, 2004) on issues of confidence in social 
institutions in transitional societies, as well as his theories on the origins of public confidence. 
Belarus was chosen for this study for several reasons: it is a transitional post-communist 
society with a short recent history of having modern social institutions; it is an example of a 
post-Soviet authoritarian regime with state control over mass media; and, due to its unique 
geopolitical position, it is of special interest to the United States (see: Belarus Democracy Act 
in chapter 3).  
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Purpose of the Study 
 
As the literature review demonstrates, the issue of public confidence in institutions is a 
crucial element in building democratic society. Scholars note that confidence in institutions is 
especially important in transitional societies, and the lack of public confidence in newly 
emerged democratic institutions hinders their effectiveness and interferes with democratic 
development. Although several theories try to explain the origins of public confidence, the role 
of mass media is generally overlooked.  
Taking into consideration that public confidence in social institutions is essential for the 
effective functioning of a society, and considering that mass media influence public opinion, 
the purpose of this thesis was to study ways in which selected social institutions are covered 
by Belarusian media and to determine if there is a connection between media coverage 
and levels of public confidence in these institutions.  
A content analysis of selected Belarusian newspapers was conducted by the author, and 
the results of the public opinion polls from Belarus, conducted by the Independent Institute for 
Socio-Economic and Political Studies1
                                                 
 
1 Independent Institute of Socio-Economic & Political Studies (IISEPS) is the first independent think 
tank in post-Communist Belarus that was established in February 1992 by group of academics, 
journalists, politicians and businessmen. Now IISEPS is registered as public institution in the Lithuanian 
Republic. 
, were examined. 
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW/THEORY BACKGROUND 
The Problem of Trust 
In the last two decades, the problem of trust has come to the fore of social science’s 
attention (Sztompka stated, 1999). Collective intellectual effort led to the conclusion that “the 
clear and simple fact that, without trust, everyday social life which we take for granted is 
simply not possible” (Seligman, 1997). In addition, “trust becomes a more urgent and central 
concern in today’s contingent, uncertain global conditions” (Misztal, 1996). 
So what is trust and why does it matter? According to Sztompka (1999), the notion of 
trust is related to the uncertainty and unpredictability of the future, which is of human 
provenance: “Trust is a bet about the future contingent actions of others”. Gambetta (1988) 
provided a similar perspective: “Trust is particularly relevant in conditions of ignorance and 
uncertainty with respect to unknown or unknowable actions of others”. Another useful 
definition is given by Earle and Cvetkovich (1995): “[Trust is] a simplifying strategy that 
enables individuals to adopt to complex social environment, and thereby benefit from 
increasing opportunities”. 
Two types of trust could be distinguished according to the objects of trust: interpersonal 
and social. While interpersonal trust is dealing with other people, social trust has a more 
abstract orientation toward different social objects, including social groups, social roles, social 
institutions and organizations, social system and order, etc.  
One of the basic reasons why trust is essential for society is its complex relationship 
with cooperation: on one hand, trust is a necessary precondition for cooperation and on the 
other, trust is a product of successful cooperation. According to Dasgupta (1988), “trust is a 
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lubricant for cooperation.” And Gambetta (1988) affirms that distrust destroys cooperation, 
writing, “If distrust is complete, cooperation will fail among free agents.”  
Sztomka (1999) identifies two types of functions related to trust: personal and social 
functions (Sztompka, 1999). On the personal level, trusting other people evokes positive 
actions towards others, and liberates and mobilizes human agency. That is, as Almond and 
Verba stress (1965), “belief in the benignity of one’s fellow citizens is directly related to one’s 
propensity to join with others in political activity.” On the other hand, distrust plays the 
opposite role, i.e. the level of activism, mobilization and freedom is lowered.  
As to the wider community, the following functions of trust are reported by Sztompka 
(1999), it (1) inspires sociability and cooperation with others (thus increasing social capital); 
(2) encourages tolerance, recognition of differences and acceptance of strangers, and (3) 
reinforces feelings of identity and collective solidarity. The opposite of trust, destroys social 
capital, and leads to isolation and decay of social networks and channels of communication. 
Distrust also mobilized defensive attitudes, stereotypes, prejudice and xenophobia. 
Sztompka (1999) suggests a brief overview of the six major social sciences concepts, in 
which, according to the author, “Trust appears as a core component,” and that demonstrates the 
importance and intensity of trust-related research: 
● Civic culture: the line of research, started by Almond & Verba (1965), switched the 
focus from the legal and institutional facts to “soft” factors, including believes and 
values.   
● Civil society: according to Alexander (1992), “[is] an arena of social solidarity that is 
defined in universal terms. It is the ‘we’ness’ of a national community, the feeling of 
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connectedness to one another… that allows there to emerge a single thread of identity 
among otherwise disparate people.”   
● Cultural capital: according to Bourdieu (1979), the key to social hierarchy and social 
organization is hidden at the cultural level. Cultural capital was defined as cultural 
signals used for cultural and social exclusion.       
● Social capital: Putnam (1995) defined social capital as “features of social life – 
networks, norms and trust – that enables participants to work together more effectively 
to pursue shared objectives… and, in short, refers to social connections and the 
attendant norms and trust.” 
● Post materialistic values: as stated by Inglehart (1990), ‘soft’ cultural concerns and 
commitments play the key role in the new set of values that emerged in developed 
societies during last decades.    
● Civilizational competence: the focus on post-communist transitions in Eastern Europe 
led Sztompka (1993, 1999) to the concept of ‘Civilizational competence’, that includes 
social trust as one of the key components.     
Apart from the above-mentioned indirect approaches that address the notion of trust as 
part of a broad cultural system, several important studies are fully focused on trust:  
● Luhmann (1979) linked trust to the growing complexity and uncertainty of 
contemporary societies, and suggested that in comparison to the traditional societies, 
trust plays an even more important role in ‘late modernity’.  
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● Gambetta (1988) and his co-authors analyzed trust in different settings, including in 
closed and exclusive communities like the Italian Mafia. 
● Hardin (1991, 1996) extended a rational-choice framework to the analysis of trust and 
distrust. 
● Fukuyama (1995) created a comprehensive framework of trust as a crucial ingredient 
for economic success (he based his arguments on examples of Japan, China and other 
South-East Asian countries). 
● Sztompka (1999) presented his own comprehensive theoretical account of trust “as a 
fundamental component of human actions.” He offers models of the emergence and 
decay of trust cultures, based on his long-term studies of the communist and post-
communist societies.  
Confidence in Social Institutions 
The problem of confidence in social institutions has been studied for more than five 
decades, and according to Newton and Norris (1999) consists of several sub-areas of research. 
Some scholars are more interested in the loss of confidence in the main institutions of 
democratic government, such as the executive branch, the parliament, the courts, the police or 
the military (see Orren 1997; Dalton 1999). Others pay more attention to public opinion about 
private institutions, such as the church, mass media, trade unions and major corporations (see 
Lipset and Schneider 1983; Manaev, 2001, 2006). Another area of research is concentrated on 
trust among people as an indicator of social stability (see Putnam 1995; Dalton 1996). 
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Scholars describe social institutions as the basic “pillars” of society. In the modern, 
complex world the confidence in such institutions provides the base for social and political 
stability (see Luhmann 1988; Dunn 1984; Giddens 1990; Seligman 1997). Despite the 
differences in the object of analysis, scholars agree that the loss of confidence in social 
institutions has a wide range of negative consequences that often extend beyond the political 
life of society (Dogan 1994; Dalton 1996; Listhaug 1995, Putnam, 1995). 
The increasing erosion of confidence in fundamental social institutions across the globe 
has been the focus of academic research since the early 1970s. For example, a Trilateral 
Commission on the Crisis of Democracy in 1975 (Crozier et al. 1975, 158-59) concluded, 
“Dissatisfaction with, and lack of confidence in, the functioning of the institutions of 
democratic government have thus now become widespread in Trilateral countries.” Since that 
time, several studies have demonstrated increasing dissatisfaction in central social institutions 
in advanced industrial democracies (see Miller 1974; Niemi et al. 1989; Dogan 1994; Dalton 
1996, 1999; Nye 1997; Nye and Zelikow 1997; Norris 1999). One study demonstrates how 
expectations of a mass public and its confidence in social institutions can have a direct effect on 
the effectiveness of a democratic government (see Putnam, 1993, 2000). 
Studying Public Confidence in Transitional Societies 
Studies of public confidence and its dramatic decline in institutions in transitional 
societies, specifically post-communist countries, are quite extensive and constitute a separate 
area of research, because of the severity of the regime repressiveness (see Markovaґ, 1994a, 
1994b; Mischler and Rose, 1997; Rose, 1994, 1995, 2003; Miller, White, and Heywood, 1998; 
Miller, Grodeland, and Koshechkina, 2001; Levada, Shubkin, Kertman, Ivanova, Yadov, 
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Shiraev, 2002; Abbott, 2002; Sztompka, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2004; Aberg and Sandberg, 2003; 
Abbott and Beck, 2003; Kochanowicz , 2004;  Jeffries, 2004; Sapsford and Abbott, 2006;).  
Polish scholar P. Sztompka (see 1996, 2002, 2004) asserts that after the collapse of the 
old Soviet system many post-communist societies experienced “cultural trauma,” which 
includes crises of trust and confidence in institutions. As a result, society is transformed into an 
“atomized society” in which trust is confined to small local pockets of inter-personal 
interaction. One of the greatest problems with such a transformation is the emergence of 
corruption on every possible level. With the erosion of confidence in social institutions, people 
prefer to solve problems using personal connections. In addition, as Sapsford and Abbott 
(2006) emphasize, the erosion of confidence in institutions results in a decline of public trust in 
the socio-economic order and as a consequence societies become unstable, and are liable to 
experience social shocks and revolutions. 
Theories of Trust and Confidence 
Over the years, many scholars attempted to explain the phenomenon of trust and public 
confidence and its decline in social institutions. Sztompka‘s (1999) three dimensions of trust – 
relational, psychological, and cultural – lead to the search for bases of trust in three different 
areas of inquiry. According to Newton and Norris (1999), the three major schools of thought on 
how to define trust and confidence include social-physiological, social-cultural and institutional 
explanations. 
The social-physiological explanations (see Erikson, 1950; Rosenberg, 1956, 1957; 
Easton, 1965; Gabriel, 1995) connect trust and confidence in institution to basic personality 
traits. The social and cultural models (see Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1990, Coleman 
1990; Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Sztompka 1996; Newton 1997; Rose, et al. 1998) explain 
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trust and confidence as the product of socialization and social experiences. The institutional 
performance model focuses on the efficiency of institutions as the key to understanding the 
citizen’s evaluations of these institutions (see Hardin, 1996; Newton and Norris, 1999; Newton, 
1999). 
It is important to note that none of these theories mention mass media as influencing 
genesis of trust and confidence in social institutions. Mass media scholars have, of course, been 
focusing on the influences of media on public opinion and political processes, elements that 
lead into notions of trust and confidence in social institutions.  
 
Media Effects: Spiral of Silence 
Scholars of the mass media have articulated a number of theories pertinent to the subject 
of this theses, including the agenda setting theory (McCombs and Shaw, 1972), gate keeping 
theory (Lewin, 1947; White, 1950), two-step flow theory (Lazarsfeld, 1944; Lazarsfeld&  Katz, 
1955), among others. In its analysis of the findings, this thesis, in part, employs the spiral of 
silence theory, which is focused not only on the mechanism of media influence but also on the 
social implications of this influence on public opinion (Noelle-Neumann, 1974; 1977; 1993). 
This theory focuses on the concept of group pressure and concentrates on the influence 
of the media on public opinion. The spiral of silence theory lies on an intersection between 
communication, sociology and political science, and thus it is of special interest for this 
researcher. The theory, introduced by German sociologist Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, states 
that people are more likely to express a certain opinion if they think that their point of view is 
shared by the majority. Their exposure to and understanding of the majority opinion is 
facilitated by the mass media, influencing their final decision on which view to support. 
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Thus, the "spiral of silence" refers to the way people tend to remain silent when they 
feel that their views are in the minority. The theory is based on three premises: (1) people have 
a "quasi-statistical organ," which allows them to sense the prevailing public opinion, even 
without access to the results of public opinion polls, (2) people fear social isolation and know 
what behavior will lead to it, and (3) people tend not to express their unpopular views, because 
of their fear of isolation. If a person believes that his/her opinion is the one held by the 
majority, he/she will more willingly express that opinion in public; if public opinion on the 
matter changes, a person will be more willing to conceal an opinion that is no longer favored by 
the public. The larger the perceived distance between popular opinion and personal opinion, the 
less likely the person will express his/her unpopular point of view. The spiral of silence occurs 
directly when people, whose opinion differs significantly from majority’s views, stay silent and 
do not express their position publicly and especially via mass communication channels. Thus 
an impression that there is only one dominant opinion in the society is created through mass 
media and other communication tools.  
Existing literature on the spiral of silence is quite extensive. Since Noelle-Neumann first 
published her work in the early 1970’s, the spiral of silence theory has been studied and tested 
repeatedly by scholars from different disciplines, including communication, sociology and 
political science, including its effect on the democratic societies (Moy, Domke, &Stamm, 2001; 
Detenber, Willnat, Aday, & Graf, 2004; Hayes, Glynn, & Shanahan, 2005; Spencer &Croucher, 
2008). Less attention has been paid, however, to the phenomenon in studies on countries with 
authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes (Manaev, Manayeva, Yuran, 2010) or in cross-
cultural studies (Lee, Detenber, Willnat, Aday, Graf, 2004; Kim, Han, Shanahan, Berdayes, 
2004).  
 13 
The only study of the spiral of silence in post-communist or authoritarian society that is 
available in English is the article, “Spiral of silence in election campaigns in post-communist 
society” (Manaev, Manayeva, Yuran, 2010). This study examines the effects of the spiral of 
silence in post-communist societies in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2001 and 
2008 in Belarus. The authors of the study assumed that in an authoritarian society, where state 
authorities use mass media as a tool of political control, particularly during important political 
campaigns (elections, referenda, etc.), the “spiral of silence” becomes the intended result of 
political communication and of control over public opinion. The socio-cultural peculiarities of 
a post-communist society, as is the case in the Belarus-focused study, significantly strengthen 
effectiveness of the phenomenon. 
The results of the study outlined in the above-mentioned article, confirm its hypothesis 
and demonstrate the existence of the effects of the spiral of silence in Belarus.  The majority of 
voters got their election campaign information from the mass media controlled by the state; 
these media, above all other candidates, covered president Lukashenko during the presidential 
campaign, and the candidates that supported him during Parliamentary campaigns. The results 
of public opinion polls demonstrated that several months before the official election campaigns 
(when voters were not sure about the majority opinion), people were more likely to cast their 
votes for opposition candidates; whereas during the official campaigns (with strong pro-
authority propaganda dominating mass media coverage), people’s perceptions of how the 
majority will vote dramatically changed as did their own electoral preferences. Coverage of the 
official campaigns in state-run media “pumped” public expectations of “majority voting” in 
favor of Lukashenko (in the presidential elections) and pro-Lukashenko candidates (in the 
parliamentary elections). 
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The study described above demonstrates that institutional changes in post-communist 
societies (including the introduction of free media and rule of law) alone are insufficient for 
real democratic transformations without parallel social-cultural changes. It also identified the 
need for further research on the issue in other post-communist countries in order to test the 
assumption that due to cultural similarities (that derive from shared experiences of the Soviet 
era) similar effects of the spiral of silence may be taking place across the region.  
Ultimately, the spiral of silence theory suggests that mass media coverage has strong 
effects on public opinion and thus it may be useful in explaining phenomena observed in this 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER III 
BELARUS BACKGROUND AND MEDIA LANDSCAPE 
Belarus: Façade Democracy and a Rogue Regime 
 Christopher Walker, Director of Studies at Freedom House, aptly outlined the 
politically based divisions in Eastern Europe in 2009. At the time of this writing, more than 
twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Central and Eastern Europe and the former states 
of the USSR are still split into two groups of countries: the new democracies and the still 
authoritarian nations2
Belarus declared independence in 1991, ending centuries of foreign control. After 
several years of democratic transition, Alexander Lukashenko
. Belarus, as well as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Russia, belong to the second category of repressive and undemocratic 
countries. In fact, “Belarus is unique among the states of the former Soviet bloc, in that after 
twelve years of ‘transition’, the country remains ‘stalled’ and backward-oriented… The country 
balances between the prospect of democracy and a retreat to authoritarianism (Korosteleva, 
Lawson & Marsh, 2003).” 
3
                                                 
 
2 Walker, C. (2009). Fast-Forward, Rewind: Press Freedom since the Berlin Wall's Fall.  
 was in 1994 elected through a 
free and fair election as the country’s first post-Soviet president. Since his election, Belarus 
rapidly evolved into “an example of a ‘façade regime’ in which democratic ‘scaffolding’ 
conceals a dictatorial style of polity building” (Korosteleva, Lawson & Marsh, 2003).  As the 
Freedom House’s report, Nations in Transit 2010, indicates, “Elected on a populist platform 
and buoyed by widespread nostalgia for Soviet-era stability, President Lukashenka pursued a 
reversal of nascent democratic openings of the early 1990... He restored Soviet-era symbols, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=72&release=1109  
3 Several variations of the spelling of his name are used in different sources, including Lukashenko and 
Lukashenka.  
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reduced the Parliament and judiciary to rubber-stamp bodies, abandoned term limits for the 
presidency, and took control over local administrations and security forces. President 
Lukashenka also curbed media freedom, suppressed political opposition, and reasserted state 
control over the economy4
In Freedom House’s annual report, Freedom in the World 2010
.” Since the 1994 election, as Manaev (2009) writes, Lukashenko 
invested himself with direct powers over most institutions; controlled the electoral process to 
the extent that none of the presidential or parliamentary elections that were held in Belarus 
since 1994 were recognized as free and fair by the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe; marginalized political opposition; took complete control over state-run media and 
nearly annihilated independent mass media, and created mechanism of control over the 
economy. 
5, Belarus was labeled as 
“Not Free” and was placed among “worst of the worst” in terms of political rights and civil 
liberties. The combined rating average for the country is 6.5 (according to the rating, 1 
represents most free and 7 the least free). As another Freedom House’s special report, Worst of 
the Worst 2010: the world’s most repressive societies,6
                                                 
 
4 Freedom House. (2011). Nations in Transit 2010. 
 indicates: “Belarus is not an electoral 
democracy. Serious and widespread irregularities have marred all recent elections. The 
constitution vests most power in the president, giving him control over the government, courts, 
and even the legislative process by stating that presidential decrees have a higher legal force 
than the laws. President Alyaksandr Lukashenka systematically curtails press freedom… 
http://freedomhouse.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=321:nations-in-transit-
2010&catid=46:nations-in-transit&Itemid=121  
5 Freedom House. (2011). Freedom in the World 2010 Annual Report.  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010   
6 Freedom House. (2011). Worst of the Worst 2010: the World’s Most Repressive Societies. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/special_report/88.pdf 
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restricts freedom of assembly and of associations. The right to a fair trial is often not respected 
in cases with political overtones.” 
The U.S. Department of State 2009 Human Rights Report,7
“The right of citizens to change their government was severely restricted. The 
government failed to account for past politically motivated disappearances. Arbitrary 
arrests, detentions, and imprisonment of citizens for political reasons, or for criticizing 
officials, or for participating in demonstrations also continued. The judiciary lacked 
independence, trial outcomes usually were predetermined, and many trials were 
conducted behind closed doors. The government further restricted civil liberties, 
including freedoms of press, speech, assembly, association, and religion and continued 
to enforce politically motivated military conscriptions of opposition youth leaders. State 
security services used unreasonable force to disperse peaceful protesters. 
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and political parties were subjected to 
harassment, fines, and prosecution.”
states that the human rights 
record of the Belarusian government remains very poor, the authorities committing frequent 
abuses:  
8
And according to the Heritage Foundation’s 2011 Index of Economic Freedom, Belarus 
economic freedom score is 47.9, which ranks the country in 155th place among the free 
economies in the world. As stated in the report
 
9
                                                 
 
7 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. (2010). 2009 Human 
Rights report. 
, the low rating is a consequence of a high 
corruption rate, an ineffective judiciary and a time-consuming bureaucracy, and strong 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136021.htm  
8 Ibid.  
9 Heritage Foundation. (2011). Index of Economic Freedom. http://www.heritage.org/Index/about  
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government interference with the private sector (which influences monetary, investment and 
financial freedoms). 
The 2010 Presidential Elections and Post-Election Development 
The Presidential election, that took place on December 19, 2010, failed to meet key 
standards of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for democratic 
elections.10 As described in European Exchange/Human Rights Centre “Viasna”/Belarusian 
Helsinki Committee’s Final Human Rights Defenders Monitoring Report on Presidential 
Election in Belarus,11 riot police brutally dispersed participants of mass demonstrations, people 
who came to the main Minsk square to protest against the unfair conduct in the elections. More 
than 700 people were arrested, including seven presidential candidates. Many protesters, 
including presidential candidates and journalists, were brutally beaten by the police. Repression 
against political opposition and independent mass media continued in the following months.12 
According to the Committee to Protect Journalists’ Attacks on the Press 2010: Belarus report13
                                                 
 
10 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights. (2010). Belarus still has considerable way to go in meeting OSCE commitments, despite certain 
improvements, election observers say. 
, 
“In a massive post-election crackdown, authorities raided news outlets and detained at least 20 
journalists covering protests over a flawed December 19 presidential vote... Leading journalists 
such as Natalya Radina, editor of the pro-opposition news website Charter 97, and Irina 
Khalip, correspondent for the Moscow newspaper Novaya Gazeta, were among those 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/74656   
11 European Exchange / Human Rights Centre “Viasna”/ Belarusian Helsinki Committee. (2011). Final 
Human Rights Defenders Monitoring Report on Presidential Election in Belarus. 
http://spring96.org/en/news/41257   
12 Reporters Without Borders. (2011). Authorities seek to suppress news of plight of held journalists. 
http://en.rsf.org/belarus-authorities-seek-to-suppress-news-24-01-2011,39386.html        
13 Committee to Protect Journalists. (2011). Attacks on the Press 2010: Belarus.  
http://www.cpj.org/2011/02/attacks-on-the-press-2010-belarus.php  
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imprisoned in December 2010. Security agents stormed newsrooms of major outlets, including 
Radio for Belarus and the satellite television channel Belsat.” As of March 2011, 42 people, 
including ex-presidential candidates, their campaign members and journalists, are facing 
criminal charges for organizing mass riots and participating in social unrest. 
The Belarus Democracy Act 
The Belarus Democracy Act is a statement of U.S. policy towards Lukashenko’s 
regime, with special focus on assistance to promote democracy and civil society in Belarus, and 
apply sanctions against the government of Belarus. Its aim is “to provide for the promotion of 
democracy, human rights, and rule of law in the Republic of Belarus and for the consolidation 
and strengthening of Belarus sovereignty and independence.”14 President George W. Bush 
stated in 2004: “The Belarus Democracy Act will help us support those within Belarus who are 
working toward democracy. We welcome this legislation as a means to bolster friends of 
freedom and to nurture the growth of democratic values, habits, and institutions within 
Belarus.”15
The original Act was signed by President 
 
Bush and passed by the U.S. Congress on 
October 4, 2004.16 The U.S. Congress amended versions of the Act in 2006,17 200818 and 
2011.19
                                                 
 
14 U.S. Congress. (2004). H.R. 854: Belarus Democracy Act of 2004. 
 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h108-854  
15 The White House Office of the Press secretary. (2004). President Bush's statement on the Belarus 
Democracy Act of 2004. http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2004/October/20041022100536btrueveceR0.8822595.html 
16 Ibid.  
17 U.S. Congress. (2006). H.R. 5948: Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2006. 
 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-5948  
18 U.S. Congress. (2008). H.R.5970 - Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2008.  
 http://www.opencongress.org/bill/110-h5970/show   
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The U.S. government’s assessment of the Belarus regime is clearly negative: “the 
government of Belarus has engaged in a pattern of clear and uncorrected violations of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms20
The Belarus Democracy Act pays close attention to the suppression of freedom of 
speech and press in Belarus: “the government of Belarus has attempted to maintain a monopoly 
over the country’s information space, targeting independent media, including independent 
journalists, for systematic reprisals and elimination, while suppressing the right to freedom of 
speech and expression of those dissenting from the dictatorship of Alexander Lukashenko, and 
adopted laws restricting the media, including the Internet, in a manner inconsistent with 
international human rights agreements.”
.” Consequently, the Act authorizes U.S. assistance for 
democratic opposition in Belarus and applies economic sanctions against the Belarusian 
government.  
21
The Belarusian Media Landscape and Media Freedom 
 
According to Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index 2010, Belarus is 
among the lowest-ranked countries: #154 of 178, and in regard to media freedom, stating in 
part, “the [Belarusian] regime makes no concession to civil society and continues… to put 
pressure on the country’s few remaining independent media outlets.”22
                                                                                                                                                           
 
19 U.S. Congress. (2011). H.R. 515: Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2011. 
 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h112-515&tab=summary   
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Reporters Without Borders. (2010). World Press Freedom Index 2010.  
http://www.rsf.org/IMG/CLASSEMENT_2011/GB/C_GENERAL_GB.pdf  
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Another widely recognized report on international media freedom, the IREX’s Media 
Sustainability Index,23 gave Belarus an overall score of 0.96 out of 4.0, on a scale from 0 to 4.0 
(where 0 is no freedom of the press), placing the country into the category of “unsustainable, 
anti-free” press systems. And according to Freedom House’ Freedom of the Press Index 
2010,24
State Control of Mass Media 
Belarus is ranked 189, along with Cuba, Libya, Burma, Turkmenistan and North Korea.      
The reason for Belarus’ low media freedom ratings is the strict control that Belarusian 
authorities gained over the mass media system since Lukashenko’s election in 1994. 
Lukashenko clearly and unequivocally stated his position on media freedom when he spoke to a 
group of journalism students at the Belarusian State University in 2008: “Media hold the 
weapon of a most destructive power. They must be controlled by the state”.25
“Economic conditions for media are not equal, subscription and distribution systems are 
monopolized or controlled by the state on a large scale and limit access for non-state 
 
According to IREX’s Media Sustainability Index, the Belarusian government restricts 
the work of media through its control or manipulation of printing houses, distribution systems, 
advertising, taxation, and of editorial policy, e.g. outright censorship, dissemination of false-
information, the filing of libel law suites, and restrictions of access to information. The Index 
succinctly states,  
                                                 
 
23 IREX. (2010). Media Sustainability Index 2010: the Development of Sustainable Independent Media 
in Europe and Eurasia.  
http://www.irex.org/system/files/Europe%20MSI%202010_Full%20Version.pdf  
24 Freedom House. (2011). Freedom of the Press 2010. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/fop/2010/FOTP2010Global&RegionalTables.pdf  
25 International Fact-Finding Mission to the Republic of Belarus. (2009). For Free and Fair Media in 
Belarus: Mission Report. 
http://baj.by/index.php?module=p&type=file&func=get&tid=6&fid=pdf&pid=33  
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media, allocation of broadcast licenses and frequencies is neither transparent nor equal, 
access to information is restricted, accreditation of journalists (working for foreign 
media) is restricted, legislation on defamation and extremism creates an environment of 
self-censorship and thus lack of publicly available information on important issues.”26
                                                 
 
26 Ibid.  
 
A new Belarus Media Law, labeled “draconian” by the Freedom House’ Freedom of the 
Press 2010 report, was approved in 2008 and took effect in 2009.  The new law set up a 
number of obstacles for independent journalists and media outlets, and shortened the list of 
journalistic rights.  
According to the International Fact-Finding Mission to the Republic of Belarus report, 
For Free and Fair Media in Belarus,24 some of the control measures include: new burdensome 
procedures for the accreditation process (journalists have to go through a three-step process and 
could be denied accreditation without any explanation); increased authority for penalizing 
journalists and mass media outlets (for vague reasons like “dissemination of inaccurate 
information that might cause harm to state and public interests,” journalist could be fined, 
operations of media outlets could be suspended or terminated); the requirement for all print and 
broadcast media outlets to re-register with the Ministry of Information (at least half a dozen 
independent media outlets were denied registration); there are also sanctions for violating 
requirements of “compliance with reality” for media materials; and foreign share in media 
ownership is restricted to 30 percent. 
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Repressive legal regulations are the norm in the Media Law of 2009. According to the 
International Fact-Finding Mission to the Republic of Belarus report For Free and Fair Media 
in Belarus27
- The Law on Public Service, which restricts public and media access to information. 
All state organizations are obliged to have spokespersons who present official 
information; these spokespersons are linked directly to the Presidential 
administration and have to follow the official ideological doctrine. Furthermore, 
state officials often refuse to provide information to independent mass media.    
, other laws detrimental to freedom of speech/press include: 
- The Law on Counteraction to Extremism, which is commonly used to impede press 
freedom: publishing materials that are considered an “extreme and present danger to 
the state or the people” could result in fines or closure of the news outlet.  
- The Criminal Code: Articles 367, 368, 369, 369-1 and 193-1. Several articles 
provide for criminal defamation for “Calumny against the President of the Republic 
of Belarus, Insults against the President of the Republic of Belarus, Insults against 
the representative of the authorities, and discrediting the Republic of Belarus”. 
These articles are widely used by the Belarusian government to prosecute 
independent media outlets. 
- Another problem is the courts, where judges are appointed directly by President 
Lukashenko, and offer little or no support for independent media. 
                                                 
 
27 Ibid.  
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The Belarusian Media Model 
According to Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm’s classic Four Theories of the Press 
(1956), the Belarusian media model could be identified as an authoritarian model: the function 
of the state-run media is to support the policies of the authorities; state-run media fosters 
support for the president, social and national unity; the state has a right to control mass media 
by the enforcing repressive media law and other means. 
The backwardness of the political regime explains why the media system in Belarus 
could be analyzed within the classical framework of Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm developed 
more than half a century ago. Although significant progress has been achieved in the studies of 
media systems since the Four Theories of the Press was published (for example, Comparing 
Media Systems, by Hallin & Mancini, 2004), most current research is either fully focused on 
Western media systems (including North America and Western Europe), or it includes post-
communist countries that embarked on democratization and adopted Western values. 
Obviously, Belarus does not fall into either category. According to Jakubowicz’s classification 
(2007), it falls into the category of non-competitive regimes, and its media system is very 
different from the media systems in Western Europe, or even from that of the Baltic states, the 
Ukraine or Poland, Belarus’s closest neighbors.  
The Mass Media Landscape 
A significant number of media outlets are registered in Belarus: 1,353 print and 240 
broadcasting outlets as of March 2011, according to Belarusian Ministry of Information.28
                                                 
 
28 Ministry of Information of the Republic of Belarus. (2011).Registered mass media outlets. 
 
However, as Manaev (2009) indicates, the mass media do not contribute substantially to the 
http://www.mininform.gov.by/rus/smi/  
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development of democracy and freedom in Belarus. To the contrary, due to strict governmental 
control, the mass media contribute to the strengthening of authoritarianism.  
The Belarusian mass media landscape is dominated by state-run media outlets whose 
editors are appointed by the President or by local authorities subservient to him. This fact has 
an enormous influence on editorial policy. As the International Fact-Finding Mission to the 
Republic of Belarus report For Free and Fair Media in Belarus indicates, state-run media 
outlets are in a beneficial position compared to the independent media: they enjoy subsidized 
rent, salaries, better distribution and printing, and tax exemptions.  
Broadcasting in Belarus remains under strict governmental control: TV channels are 
either state-owned, or Russian-owned. According to the Freedom House’ Freedom of the Press 
2010 report, “the state maintains a virtual monopoly on domestic broadcast media, which 
consistently glorify Lukashenko and vilify the opposition. Only state media broadcast 
nationwide, and the content of smaller television and radio stations is tightly restricted.”   
About two-thirds of registered newspapers and magazines are non-state owned, but the 
majority of these outlets cover entertainment and special topics.29
                                                 
 
29 International Fact-Finding Mission to the Republic of Belarus. (2009). For Free and Fair Media in 
Belarus: Mission Report. 
 There are only about 20 
national and local independent newspapers that deal with social and political issues. The 
comparison of the circulation numbers of the most popular state-run newspapers Sovetskaya 
Byelorussia (“Советская Белоруссия”) and the most popular independent newspaper 
Narodnaya Volya (“Народная Воля”) illustrates the difference in the size of the audience of 
state-run versus that of independent media: 2,000,000 to 25,000 respectively (Manaev, 
Manayeva, Yuran, 2010). 
http://baj.by/index.php?module=p&type=file&func=get&tid=6&fid=pdf&pid=33 
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CHAPTER IV  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This study examines the mass media’s role and efficacy in building public confidence in 
social institutions, and outlines the perceptions of the institutions that the public is getting from 
the mass media. Public opinion polls data analysis indicates levels of public confidence in 
institutions and illustrates the importance of print media as a source of information for 
Belarusian public. Comparison of the results of content analysis and public opinion data 
analysis made it possible to determine if there is a connection between media coverage of and 
public confidence in social institutions.  
The main research question is how are social institutions covered by the Belarusian 
media and if there is a connection between media coverage of these institutions and the 
level of public confidence in them. In order to answer the main question, a set of sub-
questions were addressed:  
1. RQ1: How are selected social institutions covered by the Belarusian mass 
media? 
2. RQ2: What is the level of confidence of the Belarusian public toward selected 
social institutions?  
3. RQ3: What is the level of trust of the Belarusian public toward news media? 
What are the characteristics of media consumption among Belarusian public? 
What are the main sources of information about internal affairs for Belarusian 
public?  
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Content Analysis 
In this study, elements of qualitative and quantitative content analysis are combined. 
The qualitative content analysis allows studying themes that were used by the mass 
media covering selected social institutions and demonstrates the difference in coverage 
between state-run and independent newspapers. This type of analysis allowed sorting out 
themes that promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, or solution to an issue, and could 
stimulate support or opposition to an issue.  The content analysis suggested the themes 
outlined. Themes derived from data analysis, and the researcher has characterized the press 
coverage by citing quotes and examples. Themes that were found in analyzed articles were 
categorized as negative, positive, and neutral. The overall tone in each theme was created by 
using direct evaluation of a social institution via the use of epithets; by presenting the 
institution as effective or ineffective, as a “problem solver” or a “problem creator”; by covering 
successes or failures of the institution; by focusing on positive or negative outcomes of actions 
of the institution. 
According to Berelson (1952), quantitative content analysis “is a research technique for 
the objective systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of the 
communication”; it allows for the examination of social interactions based on texts. A 
conceptual (or so-called thematic) type of content analysis was used in this study, because it 
allows the researcher to look at the occurrence of selected items within a text.  The quantitative 
content analysis shows how the coverage is constructed by the mass media by looking at the 
presence of several categories:  
● What is the type of publication: news, opinion, press release, official document? 
● Is there negative or positive evaluation of the institution?  
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● What is the main topic of the article?  
● What is the main subject of the article?  
● Does the story refer to the institution as an organization or is the reference personified? 
● What is the primary scope of activity of institutions in the article?    
Four institutions were chosen for the study: two institutions with high levels of 
confidence (according to IISEPS data) that represent the state (the President and the military) 
and two institutions with low level of confidence that represent the civil society (independent 
labor unions and opposition political parties). 
Articles published in a three months period, January – March 2010, were selected for 
analysis. The beginning of 2010 was a “calm” period between elections in which the mass 
media did not concentrate on covering certain institutions, such as the presidency or the 
National Assembly.30
Four major newspapers were chosen as sources for this study. As results of public 
opinion polls from Belarus demonstrate, about 65% Belarusians get their news from print 
media and most people trust print media as a reliable news source (see Manaev, 2009). The 
structure of the Belarusian media landscape (see Manaev, 2006, 2009; Manayeva, Manaev, 
Yuran, 2010) influenced the choice of sources for this study, including two nation-wide state-
run newspapers with highest circulation numbers Sovetskaya Belorussiya/Belarus Segodnya 
(«Беларусь Сегодня/Советская Белоруссия»)and Zvyazda («Звязда»), and two independent 
nation-wide newspapers: Narodnaya Volya (“Народная Воля”) and Belorusy I Rynok 
 That allowed the researcher to analyze regular, everyday coverage in 
selected newspapers.  
                                                 
 
30 Belarusian Parliament  
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(“Белорусы и Рынок”). All four newspapers have online archives that are free to public and 
served as the source of articles in this study.  
The following key search words (in both Russian and Belarusian languages)31
● For the Presidency: President, Lukashenko, Alexander Grigorievich 
(Lukashendo’s given name), Head of State; 
 were 
used to select articles for analysis (see Appendix A for a full list): 
● For the military: army, military, draft, military service, military registration and 
enlistment office, armed forces, generals and other military ranks; 
● For the opposition political parties: titles of registered political parties and 
names of their leaders; 
● For independent labor unions: titles of registered independent labor unions and 
names of their leaders. 
Public Opinion Data Analysis 
The public opinion data that was used in this study was provided by the Belarusian 
polling organization, Independent Institute for Social-Economic and Political Studies. IISEPS 
was established in Minsk, Belarus in February 1992 by a group of academics, journalists, 
politicians and businessmen. IISEPS is currently registered as a public institution in the 
Lithuanian Republic, but still conducts public opinion research in Belarus.32 Data from IISEPS 
quarterly public opinion polls are available on the organization’s website (www.iiseps.org
                                                 
 
31 This is a short list of key search words. For the full list see Appendix A.  
) and 
are open to public.  
32 In April 2005 IISEPS had been shut down by the Belarus Supreme Court. Later that year the institute was 
registered in Lithuania under the same name and with the same mission. See details at 
http://www.iiseps.org/ebullet05-2.html 
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Question about confidence in social institutions, media consumption and trust for mass 
media are included in IISEPS national polls, which are conducted quarterly, with random 
samples of approximately 1,500 respondents, and a sample error of 0.03.33
The time frame for the secondary data analysis covered the period of 2008, 2009 and 
2010. Data on media consumption was obtained from the polls of 2008, which allowed 
exploring media consumption patterns that were formed before, and presumably existed during, 
the time frame chosen for the content analysis. 
 
The following social institutions, that is their media coverage and public opinion data on 
them, were chosen for this study: the military, the President, opposition political parties, 
independent labor unions, state-run media and independent media.  
34
Justification of Methods 
 Data on confidence in social institutions came 
from the polls conducted in December 2010, several months after the analyzed articles had 
been published, when possible media effects could have taken place already. The last set of 
data on trust for state-run and independent media was drawn from two sets of polls conducted 
in 2009 and 2010, which allowed for identifying patterns in trust for media among the 
Belarusian public. 
Since there were two separate research areas in this study – (1) media coverage of 
selected social institutions and (2) public opinion about these institutions, along with trust for 
news media, and some characteristics of media consumption among Belarusian public – two 
methods were used in this research: content analysis and public opinion polls data analysis. 
                                                 
 
33 See details of methodology at http://iiseps.org/emethods.html. 
34 Polls are conducted by IISEPS quarterly. Questionnaire varies from poll to poll. Thus there was no data on 
media consumption available from a period closer (and at the same time, prior) to the time-frame selected for 
content analysis. 
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Using a combination of content analysis and public opinion polls data analysis in this research 
project allowed for the study of how Belarusian newspapers are covering selected social 
institutions, and to compare media coverage with public confidence in selected institutions.   
The first method was a content analysis of Belarusian press that incorporated elements 
of qualitative and quantitative content analysis. Qualitative analysis allowed seeing how mass 
media cover social institutions. Quantitative analysis allowed examining how the coverage is 
constructed by determining the presence of certain categories. The combination of these two 
methods in content analysis helped obtain a better understanding of media coverage of selected 
social institutions.  
The second method employed in this study is the data analyses of results of public 
opinion polls from Belarus35
                                                 
 
35 The author of this study used public opinion data in a form of SPSS files provided by IISPES. Using the data 
provided, author acquired cross tabulations and other descriptive statistics using SPPSS software. See Appendix D 
for the results.  
. Using survey data allowed for the studying of several important 
issues, like the level of confidence of the Belarusian public toward social institutions, the level 
of trust toward news media, and characteristics of media consumption among Belarusian 
public.   
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CHAPTER V 
RESUTS 
 
A total of 1,198 articles from four Belarusian newspapers were analyzed in this study. 
The search for articles that were mentioning selected institutions provided results that were 
worth noting before going content analysis. Thus, in the three-month period, independent 
newspapers published the following number of articles about selected institutions: 
• 406 articles about the presidency and President Lukashenko;  
• 40 articles about the Belarusian military;   
• 253 articles about opposition political parties and their leaders; 
• 12 articles about independent labor unions.  
During January – March 2010, independent newspapers covered all four selected 
institutions, but the amount of coverage for each institution differed from one newspaper to 
another. Most articles were about President Lukashenko and opposition political parties.  
The coverage by state-run newspapers was quite different from that of the independent 
newspapers:    
• 378 articles about the presidency and President Lukashenko (28 articles less than 
the independent newspapers); 
• 89 articles about Belarusian military (49 articles more than the independent 
newspapers);   
• 20 articles about opposition political parties and their leaders (233 articles less 
than the independent newspapers); 
• 0 articles about independent labor unions.  
 33 
State-run newspapers were excessively covering President Lukashenko; they paid close 
attention to the military as well. At the same time, their coverage of the institutions of civil 
society (including Political Parties and Labor Unions) was distinctly poor: there were only 20 
articles about Opposition political parties, and no articles about independent labor unions. 
Qualitative Content Analysis 
Results of the qualitative content analysis are presented as an analytical description 
followed by tables of identified themes in the state-run and independent newspapers. The use of 
tables to introduce the findings accentuates the differences between coverage in state-run and 
independent newspapers allowing for the presentation of the differences and similarities in 
state-run and independent newspapers themes.   
The President in State-run Newspapers  
Three major themes were found in articles published in the state-run newspapers about 
Presidents Lukashenko. Two themes were explicitly positive (themes 1 and 3): presenting 
President Lukashenko as an effective leader and decision-maker. Within these themes, 
advances in Belarusian internal and external affairs were directly attributed to Lukashenko’s 
leadership (example from Sovetskaya Belorussiya, article 145: “Today the Shklov area looks 
like a huge construction site… thanks to President Lukashenko”). The third theme was neutral 
and touched upon routine work of President Lukashenko (such as signing documents, giving 
speeches on different occasions, etc.) or provided full texts of official documents signed by the 
president. All three themes were almost equally represented in the state run newspapers: theme 
1 was found in 35.2% of articles, theme 2 in 34.9%, and theme 3 in 29.9% of articles.  
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The President in Independent Newspapers 
 The picture of the presidency painted in the independent newspapers was nearly the 
opposite of that in the state-run: analysis revealed two distinct negative themes, one neutral and 
one positive. Two negative themes presented President Lukashenko as a dictator (theme4, 
example from Narodnaya Volya, article 89: “Belarusian authorities banned public discussions 
of the new decree. The situation now resembles Stalin’s or Brezhnev’s times, when everybody 
was really proud of the USSR constitution and were constantly talking about human rights, 
while repressive mechanisms annihilated and oppressed millions of citizens”) and attributed 
problems that Belarus is facing directly to bad and ineffective leadership by Lukashenko 
(theme 1). Theme1 was found in 38.4% of articles, and theme 4 in 14% of stories. The two 
negative themes together dominated the coverage: 52.4% of articles presented President 
Lukashenko in negative themes. The neutral theme (theme 2) was the same as in state-run 
newspapers: it’s a description of President’s daily routine and official documents without any 
evaluation connotations. This theme was found in 38.2 % of all articles about Lukashenko. The 
theme that presented President Lukashenko in a positive way (as an effective leader and 
decision-maker) was found in 9.4% of articles.  
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Table 1. Themes: The President 
State-run newspapers Independent newspapers 
Theme 1 (positive): Progress and 
success in Belarusian affairs as a result 
of good leadership by Lukashenko 
(including themes such as “progress and 
success in domestic affairs as a result of 
great leadership of Lukashenko,” 
“progress and success in foreign relations 
as a result of great leadership of 
Lukashenko,” and “Lukashenko as a 
patron and benefactor”)  
Theme 1 (negative): Problems that Belarus is 
facing as a result of bad leadership by 
Lukashenko (including themes such as “problems 
in foreign relations as a result of bad leadership of 
Lukashenko,” “domestic problems as a result of bad 
leadership of Lukashenko,” “Lukashenko is 
ignoring major problems,” “critique of 
Lukashenko’s decisions / statements, Lukashenko is 
not holding his word/ breaks his own rules,” and 
“rhetoric, not supported by actions”) 
Theme 2 (neutral): Routine work/official documents (including themes such as “official 
document signed by President Lukashenko,” “routine work of the president,” and “problems in 
foreign relations (without explaining whose fault is it)” 
Theme 3 (positive): Presidents Lukashenko as a leader the main decision maker in the 
country  (including themes such as “Lukashenko is making right decisions,” “everybody 
reports to Lukashenko,” “Lukashenko gives instructions and assignments,” “Lukashenko as a 
fount of wisdom,” and “Lukashenko is not satisfied with performed work, critiques his 
subordinates and other branches of power”) 
 Theme 4 (negative): Lukashenko as a dictator 
and a supporter of rogue regimes (including 
themes such as “Lukashenko’s  regime,” 
authoritarian/ totalitarian methods of control over 
state and society,” “Lukashenko as an oppressor of 
national Belarusian culture and language,” and 
“Lukashenko as a friend and supporter of rogue 
regimes”) 
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The Military in State-run Newspapers 
Qualitative content analysis revealed that the Belarusian military was mostly presented 
in the context of positive themes. The most prominent positive theme in which the Belarusian 
military was presented was military history and World War II, encompassing 43.8% of stories. 
The second positive theme presented the Belarusian military as “a good place to be in” and 
focused on its achievements; this theme was detected in 18% of the articles. A neutral theme 
covered military routines (such as staff changes, scheduled activities of the military recruitment 
office, etc.) without any evaluations (38.2% of stories). It is worth noting that articles about the 
military frequently mentioned President Lukashenko, emphasizing the connection between the 
two. 
The Military in Independent Newspapers 
Independent newspapers covered the Belarusian military mostly in the context of 
negative themes. The most prominent negative theme (theme 4) presented the military as a tool 
of political pressure both inside of the country and in the international arena, with special 
attention being given to the use of military draft as a tool of pressure on political opposition 
(example from Narodnaya Volya, article 361: “It’s important to note that since 2008 the so-
called ‘political draft’ is used by the Belarusian authorities against young political activists”). 
This theme was found in 50% of the articles. Another negative theme (theme 2) focused on 
different problems within the military and was found in 12.5% of stories. A neutral theme, 
found in 22.5% of stories, covered the military routines without any evaluations, and a positive 
theme presented the military in articles that dealt with military history and World War II 
(12.5% of articles).  
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Table 2. Themes: The Military 
 
State-run newspapers Independent newspapers 
Theme 1 (positive): Belarusian nation and the military history  (including themes  
such as the “exploits of WWII veterans and other heroes, promoting Soviet heritage”)  
Theme 2 (positive): achievements of 
Belarusian military (including themes  
such as “technology, international trade and 
cooperation,” “women in the military,” and 
“army as a good place to be in”) 
Theme 2 (negative): defections of the 
Belarusian military  (including themes 
such as “military as bad place to be,” 
“disrespect for personal rights and rights of 
citizens in military,” and “degradation of 
the Belarusian military; obvious need to cut 
it down”) 
Theme 3 (neutral): military routine (including themes such as “law and regulations, 
promotions, congratulations and official declarations,” and “Lukashenko gives orders and 
controls”) 
 Theme 4 (negative): the military as a tool 
of pressure  (including themes such as 
“military as a tool in the international arena 
used for economic and political pressure,” 
“military (draft) as a tool of political 
pressure”) 
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Opposition Political Parties in State-run Newspapers 
State-run newspapers published only 20 stories about the opposition political parties 
during the three months period of this study. Most of these articles (80%) covered the 
opposition political parties within the scope of negative themes, presenting parties the as 
passive and ineffective (example from Zvyazda article 275: “There are almost no candidates 
from political parties in the local elections. Parties are sleeping… And all the new changes in 
the laws that make it easier for parties to participate in elections – parties are not using any of 
those opportunities”). Several other articles mentioned opposition political parties in data bared 
reports on local elections and did not contain any evaluation.  
Opposition Political Parties in Independent Newspapers 
Analysis detected several themes in the articles about opposition political parties 
published by independent newspapers. A positive theme presented parties as active participants 
in the political process and the construction of civil society, and was found in 28.1% of stories. 
Another theme (theme 3) presented political parties as targets of political repressions (example 
from Narodnaya Volya, article 437: “As soon as activists of the Young Front took out posters, 
the special police forces attacked demonstrators and started to arrest people. Using brutal force 
police dragged people into busses and beat them up”). This theme was found in 23.3% of 
stories and was presented in a non-evaluative way. Approximately 43% of the articles 
contained a neutral theme of party routines (such as party meetings, structural changes within 
parties, registration for upcoming local elections, etc). A negative theme that presented political 
parties as passive and ineffective was found in 4.7% of stories. Thus, most articles about 
opposition political parties in independent newspapers employed neutral or positive themes. 
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Table 3. Themes: Opposition Political Parties 
State-run newspapers Independent newspapers 
Theme 1 (negative): ineffectiveness of political parties (including themes such as 
“scattered nature of political opposition/conflicts between parties,” and “passiveness and 
inactivity of political parties”) 
Theme 2 (neutral): party routine (including themes such as “Activities within parties,” 
and “reports on local elections”) 
 Theme 3 (neutral): opposition parties as 
a target of political repressions 
Theme 4 (positive): parties as active 
participants is civil society and political 
process (including themes such as “parties 
as initiators of public actions,” “parties as 
alternative diplomats,” “parties as human 
rights advocates,” and “parties critique of 
the Belarusian authorities”) 
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Independent Labor Unions in State-run Newspapers 
During the three months period this study encompasses, no articles covering the 
independent labor unions were found in the state-run newspapers.   
Independent Labor Unions in Independent Newspapers 
Coverage of the labor unions was neutral or positive in independent newspapers, though 
only a small number of articles about independent labor unions were published (12 articles in 
the three months period). Three themes were equally represented. First, “independent Labor 
Unions as part of the democratic political opposition;” second, unions were presented as 
“advocates of human rights” (example from Narodnaya Volyaarticle 370: “Belarusian labor 
union in the radio-electronic industry workers continue to support activist Yuri Loban, who was 
fired by BelAz administration. The union collects donations and is ready to defend worker’s 
rights in the court.”); and third, unions were depicted as a “target of political pressure by the 
Belarusian authorities.” 
Quantitative Content Analysis 
Results of the quantitative content analysis36
The category “Publication Type”
 provided additional perspectives on the 
findings discussed earlier and contributed to the understanding of the mechanisms involved in 
constructing coverage by state-run and independent newspapers in Belarus. 
37
                                                 
 
36 This section contains selected results of the quantitative content analysis that are meaningful and important for 
this study. All results of the content analysis are in Appendix C.      
37 All categories of quantitative content analysis are in Appendix C.  
 demonstrates that in the state-run and independent 
newspapers different actors (newspapers themselves, authorities, and opposition political 
leaders) are involved in constructing themes. 
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Table 4. President in Independent Newspapers. Publication Type 
Publication Type Frequency Percent 
News Article 369 90.9% 
Opinion Piece 37 9.1% 
Press Release 0 0% 
Official Document 0 0% 
Other 0 0% 
Total 406 100.0% 
 
Table 5. President in State-run Newspapers. Publication type 
Publication Type Frequency Percent 
News Article 189 50.0% 
Opinion Piece 33 8.7% 
Press Release 144 38.1% 
Official Document 11 2.9% 
Other 1 0.3% 
Total 378 100.0% 
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While  independent newspapers mostly published news articles and some opinion 
pieces, e.g. editorials and interviews with experts (Table 4) in state-run newspapers, press 
releases and full texts of official documents (such as presidential decrees38
Table 6. President in State-run Newspapers. Nature of Actions 
 and other legislative 
acts) make up more than 40% of publications about president (Table 5). By publishing press 
releases and other official documents, that were created by Lukashenko’s administration, 
without any alterations or additional information, state-run newspapers yield some control over 
framing to the authorities, thus providing them with a platform for political propaganda. 
The next category of content analysis, “Nature of Actions,” (Table 6) presents how the 
actions and decisions made by the President were presented in newspapers. By providing 
different prognoses about future outcomes of the President’s actions or discussing different 
consequences of his decisions, independent and state-run newspapers were able to give indirect 
evaluations of the President, thus creating positive and/or negative coverage. 
Actions Frequency Percent 
Attempt/ Intent to do Good 76 20.1% 
Have/ Will have Positive Outcome 138 36.5% 
Have/ will have Negative Outcome 0 0% 
Actions are not being taken, though necessary 0 0% 
Neutral/ no outcome could be inferred 164 43.4% 
Total 378 100.0% 
 
                                                 
 
38 In Belarus Presidential decrees are regarded as legislation.  
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Table 7. President in Independent Newspapers. Nature of Actions 
Actions Frequency Percent 
Attempt/ Intent to do Good 43 10.6% 
Have/ will have Positive Outcome 14 3.4% 
Have/ will have Negative Outcome 108 26.6% 
Actions are not being taken, though necessary 54 13.3% 
Neutral/no outcome could be inferred 187 46.1% 
Total 406 100% 
 
Given the nature of what was published, it is not surprising that in state-run newspapers, 
in the majority of instances, the actions taken by the President were described as beneficial (or 
potentially beneficial) for the country and the Belarusian people (Table 6). At the same time, 
when discussing the same events, independent newspapers were constructing negative themes 
by presenting the President’s actions as wrong, harmful, or potentially dangerous; or by 
pointing out the fact that the President does not always pay attention to important social 
problems.  
Similarly, independent and state-run newspapers were giving indirect evaluations of the 
Belarusian military and opposition parties39
Public Opinion Data Analysis  
 by providing different prognoses about future 
outcomes of their actions. 
Trust in the media by the Belarusian public  
                                                 
 
39 For details, see appendix C. 
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Even though state-run and independent media in Belarus are not comparable in audience 
size, it looks as if they enjoy roughly similar levels of public trust. In June 2009, 45.3% of 
respondents said that they trusted independent media, whereas 35.5 % expressed distrust. At the 
same time, 44.7% of respondents declared that they trusted state-run media, while 42.1% said 
that they distrusted them. A year and a half later, by December 2010, trust for both kinds of 
media had risen: 46.3% of respondents declared their trust for independent media, and 52.9% 
for state-run media. 
 Media consumption and sources of information of the Belarusian public 
The data that was used in this section came from several IISEPS national public opinion 
polls conducted in 2008. According to this data, print media remain an influential source of 
information for the Belarusian public. A reported 60.5% of respondents get information about 
life in Belarus and abroad “most often from newspapers.” Among them, 85.7% get information 
about life in Belarus from the state-run media, and 35.4% get it from the independent media. 
The most popular newspaper is Sovetskaya Belorussiya: more than a quarter of respondents 
read it “daily” or “often”, and 16% “from time to time.”  
 Interdependence between trust in the mass media and confidence in social institutions  
A crucial aspect of the public opinion analyses involves the interdependence between 
trust for independent and state-run mass media, and confidence in selected social institutions. 
The author of this thesis was guided by the assumption that trust in media outlets and trust in 
messages these outlets disseminate are closely related. In other words, trust in the source, 
influences trust in the message.  
The data that was used in this section came from IISEPS December 2010 national 
public opinion poll. Following are the results by institution. 
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Table 8. Trust for Mass Media and Confidence in Selected Social Institutions 
Of those who trust independent media Of those who trust state-run media 
The President 
48.8% have confidence in the President 
and 42.2% do not. 
89.3% have confidence in the President 
and 7.1% do not.   
The Military 
50.4% have confidence in Belarusian 
Military and 36.9% do not.   
76% have confidence in Belarusian 
military and 15.5% do not.   
Opposition Political Parties 
22.9% have confidence in opposition 
political parties and 59.4% do not. 
15% have confidence in opposition 
political parties and 72% do not.   
Independent Labor Unions 
47.3% have confidence in the independent 
labor unions and 32.6% do not. 
42.3% have confidence in the independent 
labor unions and 35.4% do not.   
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Results of public opinion polls showed that people who trust state-run media also have 
very strong confidence in the President. Almost 90% of them declared their confidence in the 
President, while only 7.1% had no confidence in Lukashenko. These people have a much 
higher level of confidence in the President than do people who trust independent media. 
Among those who trust state-run media, the number of people who have confidence in the 
President is nearly twice as high as that among people who trust independent media. The 
number of people who do not have confidence in the President is more than four  times smaller 
among those who trust independent media. Given that state-run media present the President 
almost exclusively in the context of positive themes and the independent media seldom address 
the President’s “achievements” and mostly concentrate on his failures and shortcomings, a 
strong connection between media coverage of the President and levels of confidence in him is 
detected. Although other important factors may be involved and it is impossible to prove causal 
relationship at this stage, the observed connection between media coverage and public 
confidence in social institutions is evident. 
The case of the public’s confidence or lack thereof in the military is somewhat similar. 
Most of the people (71%) who trust state-run media are confident in the military, whereas the 
levels of confidence in the military among those who trust independent media are significantly 
lower. The number of people who do not have confidence in the military is two times smaller 
among those who trust state-run media compared to the audience of the independent media. In 
light of mostly positive or neutral coverage of Belarusian military in state-run newspapers and 
mostly negative coverage in independent print media, different levels of confidence in the 
institution provide additional prove of the connection between media coverage and public 
opinion. 
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Confidence in oppositional political parties is low in both groups. Even though logic 
dictates that the difference here should be more noticeable, public opinion data are consistent 
with the results of the content analysis. Coverage of opposition political parties in independent 
newspapers could be described as mostly neutral (with 66% of articles employing neutral 
themes); thus this independent media do not urge the public to think of parties in a positive or a 
negative way. The amount of media coverage an institution gets may play a significant role in 
public perception of this institution. Even though state-run media write about opposition parties 
mostly in the context of negative themes, the amount of coverage is not ample and is likely to 
be ignored by the public. 
There is almost no difference in the levels of confidence in independent labor unions 
between people who trust independent media and those who trust state-run media. Lack of 
information on independent labor unions in both state-run and independent newspapers might 
serve as a possible explanation alongside with a lack of personal experiences with such 
institution among the Belarusian public. 
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CHAPTER V  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
 Social scientists agree that public confidence in social institutions is a crucial element in 
building a democratic society. This is especially true for transitional societies, including post-
communist countries, because the lack of public confidence in newly emerged democratic 
institutions can interfere with democratic development of these societies. 
Although, over the years, different theories explaining the phenomenon of public 
confidence in social institutions was developed, these theories tend to ignore the role that mass 
media play in building public confidence. 
The ultimate goal of this study was to prove that there is a connection between mass 
media coverage and public confidence in social institutions. 
Combined results of content analyses and public opinion polls data analyses suggested 
that there is an evident connection between media coverage and public confidence in social 
institutions. 
Content analyses demonstrated that the state-run newspapers publish a great number of 
articles about President Lukashenko, covering him within the scope of explicitly positive 
themes. He was presented as an effective leader and decision-maker. The successes in 
Belarusian internal and external affairs were directly attributed to Lukashenko’s leadership. As 
results of public opinion polls demonstrate, the President enjoys a high level of confidence 
(90%) among people who trust state-run media, but not among those who trust independent 
media. 
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Independent newspapers present President Lukashenko in a different light. He is 
covered within the scope of two distinct negative themes: he is being depicted as a dictator and 
an ineffective leader. According to public opinion polls, only 42% of people who trust 
independent media have confidence in the President. 
Given that state-run newspapers present the President almost exclusively within positive 
themes and independent newspapers seldom address the President’s achievements, mostly 
concentrating on his failures and shortcomings, a strong connection between media coverage of 
the President and levels of confidence in him appears to exist. 
Examining media coverage and public opinion about other social institutions (the 
military and opposition political parties) provided similar results, suggesting a connection 
between media coverage and public confidence. 
Even though causal effects are still to be tested, ignoring the role of media in building 
public confidence in social institutions would be a mistake for scholars in all relevant 
disciplines. 
Although, from a mass communication perspective, several theories can be used to 
explain the apparent connection between the media coverage and the public opinion that was 
revealed in the study,40
                                                 
 
40 According to the framing theory, mass media cover certain issues and thus make them more salient, 
and frames these issues by interpreting them and placing facts within the field of meaning (see 
 the spiral of silence theory is of special interest to the author. This 
Davis, 1975; 
Entman, 1993; Fairhurst & Star, 1996; Miller, 1997; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; D'Angelo, 2002). Content 
analysis demonstrated that the state-run and independent newspapers are using different themes when presenting 
information about social institutions. The difference was especially noticeable in the coverage of the president and 
oppositional political parties. State-run and oppositional newspapers presented the same topics and issues (for 
example – local elections), but they presented the news in different (sometimes opposite) ways. Within the 
gatekeeping theory the gatekeepers, such as media or authorities, control the flow of information and decide which 
information will be available to the public (see Lewin, 1947; White, 1964; McCombs et al, 1976; Willis, 1987).  In 
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theory is focused on the mechanism and social implications of the media influence on public 
opinion. As previous research (Manaev, Manayeva, Yuran, 2010) demonstrated, there is a 
strong evidence of the spiral of silence effects in Belarus.  
According to the spiral of silence theory, (Noelle-Neumann, l973, 1993; Lee, 1989; 
Scheufele & Moy, 2000) people are less likely to voice their opinion if they think that they are 
in the minority and the media play a great part in forming individuals' perception of the opinion 
climate. With the help of mass media vocal majority intimidates others into silence. This theory 
is useful in understanding the situation in Belarus. State-run mass media dominate the media 
sphere in Belarus, and there is a shortage of the alternative sources of information. As the 
content analysis demonstrated, activities of the opposition political parties and independent 
labor unions are either not covered by the state-run newspapers, or parties are presented as 
ineffective and passive actors. That is where the spiral of silence mechanisms come into play: if 
people with “protest potential” who are not satisfied with Belarusians authorities read state-run 
newspapers or watch state-run television, they will get the impression that nothing is going on 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
Belarus state-run newspapers keep silent about repression against oppositional political parties and independent 
labor unions. Moreover, by publishing unchanged press releases from the Lukashenko’s administration, state-run 
newspapers give control over framing to Belarusian authorities, thus providing them with additional tool of direct 
control over media content. 
Agenda setting theory states that the media tell the public not what to think, but what to think about (see 
McCombs & Shaw, 1972, 1977; McCombs 1972, 1982; McCombs & Weaver, 1973, 1985; Rogers & Dearing, 
1988; Kleinnijenhuis & Rietberg, 1995; McCombs, 2004). As the results of content analysis demonstrated, 
Belarusian state-run newspapers almost completely ignore institutions of civil society (the oppositional political 
parties and independent labor unions). Activities of those institutions are not covered by the media, and thus they 
are getting excluded from the public discourse. At the same time, state-run newspapers attribute most of 
Belarusian accomplishments attribute those directly to the leadership of President Lukashenko, thus promoting an 
image of Lukashenko as a thoughtful, caring and successful leader.  The media dependency theory (Ball-Rokeach 
& DeFleur, 1976; Donohew, Palmgreen, & Rayburn, 1987; Baran and Davis, 2009) states that the more a person 
becomes dependent on the media to get his/her needs fulfilled, the more the media will become important for the 
individual and the more influence it will have. Taking in consideration peculiarities of the Belarusian media 
landscape, such as strict governmental control over state-run mass media and shortage of alternative sources of 
information, this theory might be useful in explanation of the strong influence of the mass media on the public 
opinion.  
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in the public sphere – nobody is protesting, or is criticizing the authorities, opposition is weak 
and inactive (or even that there is no opposition at all). As a consequence, people will either 
stay silent and will not get engaged in political activities, or they might even line up with the 
opinion that is presented by the predominant media outlets and seemingly shared by the 
majority of Belarusians. 
Although studying the influence of mass media on the public’s confidence in social 
institutes is important from an academic perspective (generating new knowledge), the results 
could also be applied in a number of ways. For several decades, the promotion of democracy 
around the world has been one of the most important elements of American foreign policy 
doctrine. But further democratization is impossible without the proliferation and acceptance of 
democratic values. Studying the ways authoritarian countries such as Belarus are using mass 
media to influence public opinion could achieve a better understanding of the mechanisms at 
work and could facilitate more effective interactions with publics in those countries.   
Suggestions for Future Research 
Research on the influence of mass media on public’s confidence in social institutions 
could be enhanced in a number of ways. 
Current research could be extended by including other institutions of civil society 
covered by the media in a study in order to find out if there is a similar connection between 
media coverage and public confidence in those institutions. Extending the study to other 
countries and regions with similar media environments where media are partially or completely 
controlled by the state (for example, Venezuela, Russia) could be done. This would allow 
comparative testing of interactions between mass media and public trust in social institutions. 
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It also might be useful to extend the research of connection between media coverage 
and confidence in social institutions by exploring the spiral of silence effects on electoral 
behavior. 
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APPENDIX B 
RESULTS OF QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS  
 
Themes: President  
- Problems with foreign relations as a result of bad leadership of Lukashenko (independent 
newspapers) 
• Belorusy I Rynok, 002. “Polish authorities stated that are not satisfied with 
Lukashenko’s position on human rights violations”  
• Belorusy I Rynok 090. “Belarusian president isn’t about to change his positions. We can 
only hope that it will not result in great financial loss for Belarus… But it probably 
will”  
• Belorusy I Rynok 054. “Belarusian authorities failed to convince Russia to sign the 
contract on Belarusian conditions”   
- Lukashenko’s “regime”, authoritarian/ totalitarian methods of control over state and society 
(independent newspapers) 
• Narodnaya Volya, 011. “Independent experts are assured that Lukashenko’s decree #60 
will be used as a tool of control and blocking alternative sources of information during 
up-coming elections”   
• Narodnaya Volya 067. “Lukashenko’s dictatorship” 
• Narodnaya Volya 089. “Belarusian authorities banned public discussions of the new 
decree. The situation now resembles Stalin’s or Brejnev’s times, when everybody was 
really proud of the USSR constitution and were constantly talking about human rights, 
while repressive mechanisms annihilated and oppressed millions of citizens”  
- Domestic problems as a result of bad leadership of Lukashenko (independent newspapers) 
• Belorusy I Rynok 020 “The effectiveness of new agrarian reform is very low” 
• Belorusy I Rynok 025 “Behind nice-looking facades of the main Minsk avenue once 
major and well known industrial plants are languishing in poverty. Well-developed 
instry, inherited by Belarus from the USSR is ruined by Belarusian authorities” 
• Narodnaya Volya 008 (story about new custom regulations, introduced by Lukashenko) 
“One way or another, after the New Year Belarusian car dealers became depressed and 
lost. They are scared by the uncertainty and ambiguity of new regulations” 
- Lukashenko is not holding his word/ breaks his own rules (independent newspapers) 
• Belorusy I Rynok 30 “Last year Lukashenko promised the public not to raise utility 
rates. But the rates were raised” 
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• Narodnaya Volya 068 “It looks like the censorship is only applied to opposition web 
sites” 
• Narodnaya Volya 081 “Will the regulations be canceled only on paper? We believe so. 
Local authorities will continue to twist arms of local business” 
- Critique of Lukashenko’s decisions / statements (independent newspapers) 
• Belorusy I Rynok 088. “Decree 60 is all about control of information in Belarusian 
society”   
• Narodnaya Volya 097. “Lukashenko’s general plan for Minsk development opens up 
opportunities for corruption and potential damage to private sector” 
• Narodnaya Volya 071. “With the decree #60 Alexander Lukashenko created so many 
problems, that it will take us years to solve them”   
- Lukashenko as an oppressor of national Belarusian culture and language  
• Narodnaya Volya 012. “At the press conference Lukashenko clearly stated his position 
on Belarusian language: there will be no state support for Belarusian language.  
• Narodnaya Volya 087. “Last statements of President Lukashenko about Belarusian 
language (at the December press conference) generated a lot of comments from our 
readers; they were offended by Lukashenko’s positions”    
- Lukashenko as a friend and supporter of rogue regimes  
• Belorusy I Rynok 028 “Belarus’ reputation of a friend of rogue regimes could lead to 
economic sanctions from the United States” 
• Belorusy I Rynok 068 “We’ve buried capitalism – that was Lukashenko’s catch phrase 
during his official visit to Venezuela” 
- Lukashenko is ignoring major problems  
• Belorusy I Rynok 089 “It looks like Lukashenko is to going to implement economic 
changes that are required by the IMF in order to get another credit” 
- Rhetoric, not supported by actions  
• Belorusy I Rynok 007. In his speech, Lukashenko was trying to switch focus from 
numerous economic problems to exaggerated and questionable victories”     
- Problems with foreign relations (without explaining whose fault is it) 
• Belorusy I Rynok 039 “Belarusian and Russian delegation could not reach the 
agreement again” 
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• Belorusy I Rynok 041 “Current gas and oil confrontation with Russian brought to a 
question Russia-Belarus military alliance” 
- Progress and success in foreign relations as a result of great leadership of Lukashenko (state-
run newspapers) 
• Sovetskaya Bielorussia 141: “Until the end of this year Belarus will get 4 million tons 
of Venezuela oil. This agreement was reached by President Lukashenko during his visit 
to Karakas.” 
- Everybody reports to Lukashenko    
• Sovetskaya Bielorussia 119: President Lukashenko had a meeting with State Secretary 
of Defense, who reported to the president.   
- Lukashenko gives instruction and assignments  
• Sovetskaya Bielorussia 044: “President demanded to work out transit agreements in the 
best interests of Belarus.” 
- Lukashenko is not satisfied with performed work, critiques his subordinates  
• Sovetskaya Bielorussia 101: “President Lukashenko expressed his displeasure with the 
work of Belarusian linen producers.”   
• Sovetskaya Bielorussia 016: “President criticized the work of the government.” 
- Lukashenko as a patron and benefactor (state-run newspapers) 
• Sovetskaya Bielorussia 145: “Today Shklov area looks like a huge construction site… 
thanks to President Lukashenko.” 
- Lukashenko is making right decisions  
• Sovetskaya Bielorussia 097: “President signed a new decree… “This will be terrific for 
the Grodno region”, said Alexader Yakobson from Grodno.” 
- Routine work of the president (independent and state-run newspapers)         
• Sovetskaya Bielorussia 008: “Lukashenko visited Switzerland” 
 
Themes: Opposition political parties 
- Repressions against opposition political parties (independent newspapers) 
• Narodnaya Volya 402: “Anatoly Lebednko will be taken into court for his support for 
the Polish Union.” 
• Narodnaya Volya 437: “As soon as activists of the Young Front took out posters, the 
special police forces attacked demonstrators and started to arrest people. Using brutal 
force police dragged people into busses and beaten them up.” 
- Parties as alternative diplomats (independent newspapers) 
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• Narodnaya Volya 409: “Delegation of the Belarusian opposition visit Warsaw. They 
will meet with representatives of Polish government, European Union and other and 
international organizations and discuss situation in Belarus.” 
- Parties critique of the Belarusian authorities (independent newspapers) 
• Belorusy I Rynok 121: “As the leader of United Civil Party stated, the party is not 
satisfied with the changes in election regulations, because political parties did not get a 
guaranteed opportunity to take part in control over counting the votes.”    
• Belorusy I Rynok 129: “The leader of BNF stated that the Belarusian authorities have 
total control over electoral process.” 
- Parties as human rights advocates (independent newspapers) 
• Belorusy I Rynok 117: “United Civil Party reacted to the outcome of the court 
hearings… The party will take efforts to push international organization to recognize A. 
Bondarenko as a prisoner of conscience.” 
- Scattered nature of political opposition / conflicts between parties (independent and state-run 
newspapers) 
• Belorusy I Rynok 118 “On October 27th declaration on the new “Belarusian Independent 
block” was signed. The new block devaluate the importance of the United Democratic 
Forces as an organization representing most of the opposition. The notion of “united 
opposition” is now destroyed, and the chances to agree on the single candidate are 
going down.    
- Activities within parties (independent newspapers)   
• Narodnaya Volya 603 “Last weakened Anatoly Lebendko was re-elected as a a head of 
the United Civil Party.” 
- Passiveness and inactivity of political parties (state-run newspapers) 
• Sovetskaya Bielorussia 256. “Political parties are being passive again – only 3% of all 
applications came from them. The same picture with the formation of local committees. 
Less than 1% of applications came from political parties.”     
• Zvyazda 275 “There are almost no candidates from political parties in the local 
elections. Parties are sleeping… And all the new changes in the laws that make it easier 
for parties to participate in elections – parties are not using any of those opportunities.” 
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APPENDIX C 
RESULTS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS 
 
a. Newspaper 
1. Sovetskaya Bielorussia 
2. Zvyazda 
3. Narodnaya Volya 
4. Belorusy I Rynok 
 
b. Article number  
 
c. Type of publication: 
1. News article 
2. Opinion piece (editorial, expert interview etc.) 
3. Press release (if apparent) 
4. Official document (presidential decrees and directives, other legislative acts) 
5. Other 
  
d. Main topic 
1. Domestic politics 
2. International politics 
3. Domestic economy 
4. International economy 
5. Sports 
6. Culture and science 
7. Everyday life  
8. Other 
 
e. Main subject in the article 
1. President 
2. Military 
3. Independent unions 
4. Opposition parties 
5. Other   
 
f. Secondary subject in the article 
1. President 
2. Military 
3. Independent Unions 
4. Opposition Parties 
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g. Institution in general or personified  
1. Institution 
2. Person 
 
h. Apparent evaluation of the main subject 
1. Positive 
2. Negative 
3. Neutral 
 
i. Apparent evaluation of the secondary subject 
1. Positive 
2. Negative 
3. Neutral  
 
j. Nature of actions of the institution   
1. Attempt/intent to do good 
2. Have/ will have positive outcome 
3. Have/ will have negative outcome 
4. Actions are not being taken, though necessary (apathetic). 
5. Neutral/none (not an action oriented article or no indications of the action 
outcomes are present in the article, actions of other subjects are being discussed)
   
k. Main frame of the article (see the list of frames) 
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Table C1. Military in State-run Newspapers. Nature of Actions 
Actions Frequency Percent 
Attempt/ Intent to do Good 15 16.9% 
Have/ will have Positive Outcome 51 57.3% 
Neutral/no outcome could be inferred 23 25.8% 
 
Table C2. Military in Independent Newspapers. Nature of Actions 
Actions Frequency Percent 
Attempt/ Intent to do Good 1 2.5% 
Have/ will have Positive Outcome 2 5.0% 
Have/ will have Negative Outcome 17 42.5% 
Actions are not being taken, though 
necessary 2 5.0% 
Neutral/no outcome could be inferred 18 45.0% 
 
Table C3. Opposition Parties in State-run Newspapers. Nature of Actions 
Actions Frequency Percent 
Have/ will have Negative Outcome 3 15.0% 
Actions are not being taken, though 
necessary 15 75.0% 
Neutral/no outcome could be inferred 2 10.0% 
 
Table C4. President in State-run Newspapers. Nature of Actions 
Actions Frequency Percent 
Attempt/ Intent to do Good 76 20.1% 
Have/ Will have Positive Outcome 138 36.5% 
Neutral/ no outcome could be infered 164 43.4% 
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Table C5. Opposition Parties in Independent Newspapers. Nature of Actions 
Actions Frequency Percent 
Attempt/ Intent to do Good 115 45.5% 
Have/ Will have Positive Outcome 33 13.0% 
Have/ will have Negative Outcome 2 0.8% 
Actions are not being taken, though 
necessary 10 4.0% 
Neutral/none 93 36.8% 
 
Table C6. President in Independent Newspapers. Publication Type 
Publication Type Frequency Percent 
News Article 369 90.9% 
Opinion Piece 37 9.1% 
 
Table C7. President in State-run Newspapers. Publication type. 
Publication Type Frequency Percent 
News Article 189 50.0% 
Opinion Piece 33 8.7% 
Press Release 144 38.1% 
Official Document 11 2.9% 
Other 1 0.3% 
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APPENDIX D 
PUBLIC OPINION POLLS DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
Table D1. Crosstab: Trust in State-run Media and Confidence in Independent Unions 
Trust to State-run Media / 
Confidence in Independent 
Unions 
Trust 
State-run 
Media 
Do not 
trust State-
run Media 
N/A Total 
Confident in 
Independent Unions 
Count 338 152 14 504 
Percent 42.3% 26.1% 10.8% 33.3% 
Not confident in 
Independent Unions 
Count 283 317 22 622 
Percent 35.4% 54.5% 16.9% 41.1% 
Not sure about 
Independent Unions 
Count 178 112 94 384 
Percent 22.3% 19.2% 72.3% 25.4% 
N/A 
Count 1 1 0 2 
Percent 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% 
Total 
Count 800 582 130 1512 
Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table D2. Crosstab: Trust in State-run Media and Confidence in Opposition Parties 
Trust to State-run Media / 
Confidence in Opposition 
Parties 
Trust 
State-run 
Media 
Do not 
trust State-
run Media 
N/A Total 
Confident in 
Opposition Parties 
Count 120 123 3 246 
Percent 15.0% 21.1% 2.3% 16.3% 
Not confident in 
Opposition Parties 
Count 575 335 38 948 
Percent 72.0% 57.6% 29.2% 62.7% 
Not sure about 
Opposition Parties 
Count 102 123 89 314 
Percent 12.8% 21.1% 68.5% 20.8% 
N/A 
Count 2 1 0 3 
Percent 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 
Total 
Count 799 582 130 1511 
Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 74 
 
Table D3. Crosstab: Trust in State-run Media and Confidence in Military 
Trust to State-run Media / 
Confidence in Military 
Trust 
State-run 
Media 
Do not trust 
State-run 
Media 
N/A Total 
Confident in Military 
Count 608 155 46 809 
Percent 76.0% 26.7% 35.4% 53.6% 
Not confident in 
Military  
Count 124 355 11 490 
Percent 15.5% 61.2% 8.5% 32.5% 
Not sure about 
Military 
Count 68 70 73 211 
Percent 8.5% 12.1% 56.2% 14.0% 
Total 
Count 800 580 130 1510 
Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  
 
Table D4. Crosstab: Trust in State-run Media and Confidence in President 
Trust to State-run Media / 
Confidence in President 
Trust 
State-run 
Media 
Do not 
trust State-
run Media 
N/A Total 
Confident in 
President 
Count 714 81 38 833 
Percent 89.3% 13.9% 29.0% 55.1% 
Not confident in 
President 
Count 57 449 9 515 
Percent 7.1% 77.1% 6.9% 34.0% 
Not sure about 
President 
Count 29 52 84 165 
Percent 3.6% 8.9% 64.1% 10.9% 
Total 
Count 800 582 131 1513 
Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table D5. Crosstab: Trust in Independent Media and Confidence in Independent Unions 
Trust to Independent Media / 
Confidence in Independent 
Unions 
Trust 
Independent 
Media 
Do not trust 
Independent 
Media 
N/A Total 
Confident in 
Independent 
Unions 
Count 331 159 14 504 
Percent 47.3% 25.6% 7.4% 33.4% 
Not confident in 
Independent 
Unions 
Count 228 367 26 621 
Percent 32.6% 59.1% 13.7% 41.1% 
Not sure about 
Independent 
Unions 
Count 140 95 149 384 
Percent 20.0% 15.3% 78.4% 25.4% 
N/A 
Count 1 0 1 2 
Percent 0.1% 0.0% 0.5% 0.1% 
Total 
Count 700 621 190 1511 
Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table D6. Crosstab: Trust in Independent Media and Confidence in Opposition Parties 
Trust to Independent Media / 
Confidence in Opposition 
Parties 
Trust 
Independent 
Media 
Do not trust 
Independent 
Media 
N/A Total 
Confident in 
Opposition Parties 
Count 160 83 3 246 
Percent 22.9% 13.3% 1.6% 16.3% 
Not confident in 
Opposition Parties 
Count 416 486 46 948 
Percent 59.4% 78.1% 24.2% 62.7% 
Not sure about 
Opposition Parties 
Count 123 51 141 315 
Percent 17.6% 8.2% 74.2% 20.8% 
N/A 
Count 1 2 0 3 
Percent 0.1% 0.3% 0.0% 0.2% 
Total 
Count 700 622 190 1512 
Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table D7. Crosstab: Trust in Independent Media and Confidence in Military 
Trust to Independent Media / 
Confidence in Military 
Trust 
Independent 
Media 
Do not trust 
Independent 
Media 
N/A Total 
Confident in 
Military 
Count 352 389 68 809 
Percent 50.4% 62.5% 35.8% 53.5% 
Not confident in 
Military  
Count 258 202 30 490 
Percent 36.9% 32.5% 15.8% 32.4% 
Not sure about 
Military 
Count 89 31 92 212 
Percent 12.7% 5.0% 48.4% 14.0% 
Total 
Count 699 622 190 1511 
Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table D8. Crosstab: Trust in Independent Media and Confidence in President 
Trust to Independent Media /  
Confidence in President 
Trust 
Independent 
Media 
Do not trust 
Independent 
Media 
N/A Total 
Confident in 
President 
Count 342 409 81 832 
Percent 48.8% 65.9% 42.6% 55.0% 
Not confident in 
President 
Count 296 194 25 515 
Percent 42.2% 31.2% 13.2% 34.1% 
Not sure about 
President 
Count 63 18 84 165 
Percent 9.0% 2.9% 44.2% 10.9% 
Total 
Count 701 621 190 1512 
Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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